Rabbi Shay Tahan

It sounds almost like something from a bizarre movie: a prison surrounded by trenches filled with crocodiles. Yet this is precisely the unusual security proposal being advanced by Israel’s National Security Minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir. The plan calls for Nile crocodiles to be placed in trenches surrounding Ketziot Prison in southern Israel, where Palestinian security prisoners, including detainees from Gaza, are being held.
In this article, we will examine the relevant sources in Chazal and the poskim concerning dangerous animals, the obligation to avoid creating situations of danger, and the extent to which one may introduce and maintain inherently dangerous animals in an area where people are present.

The Torah establishes that, under ordinary circumstances, when an animal causes damage, its owner is liable for only half of the damage. Such an animal is considered tam, meaning that it has not yet established a pattern of causing damage. After the animal has caused damage on three occasions and thereby established itself as one that is likely to cause harm, it becomes a mu’ad, and its owner is liable for the full amount of the damage.

The Mishnah (Bava Kamma 15b), however, teaches that this rule does not apply equally to all animals. Certain animals are considered mu’ad from the outset, meaning that their dangerous nature is so well established that they are treated as mu’ad even before they have caused any damage. The Mishnah lists several examples, including the lion, wolf, bear, leopard, and snake. Since these animals are inherently dangerous, they are considered mu’ad from the outset, and their owners are subject to the greater liability associated with a mu’ad.

In light of this principle, one might ask whether a crocodile should likewise be included among the animals that are mu’ad from the outset. A crocodile is a large and inherently dangerous wild animal, capable of causing severe injury or death. Unlike a domesticated animal, it cannot ordinarily be presumed to be harmless simply because it has not previously caused damage.

The discussion, however, goes beyond the question of financial liability. The Maharshal, in his Yam Shel Shlomo, makes a significant point concerning dangerous animals. He writes that, in addition to the owner’s liability for damage caused by such an animal, one is not permitted to bring such wild and dangerous animals into his possession in the first place.

This introduces a second and fundamentally different halachic question. The first concerns liability for damages: if a dangerous animal causes injury or property damage, what responsibility does its owner bear? The second concerns the very act of keeping the animal: is a person permitted to keep a dangerous creature when doing so creates a potential danger to others?

This distinction is particularly relevant to the proposed use of crocodiles at a prison. Even if the crocodiles were to be kept in specially constructed trenches, securely separated from the prisoners and from the general public, and even if their sole purpose were to provide an additional layer of security, the question remains whether halachah permits the deliberate introduction and maintenance of such inherently dangerous animals in an area where human beings are present.

Thus, the issue is not merely what the halachah would require if a crocodile escaped and caused damage. The more fundamental question is whether one may create such a potential danger in the first place.

To explore this question, we must turn to another Mishnah in Bava Kamma (79b), which addresses the question of keeping a potentially dangerous animal. The Mishnah teaches that one may not raise a dog unless it is kept securely chained. The Gemara (83a) further explains that there are circumstances in which a person may keep a dog for security purposes. For example, people who live near the border of enemy territory may keep the dog chained during the day and release it at night while they sleep, allowing it to protect them from potential danger.

From this discussion, we can potentially derive two important principles relevant to our case.

First, the danger posed by an animal may be mitigated when the animal is properly secured and prevented from coming into contact with people.

Second, the Gemara establishes that there are circumstances in which a dangerous animal may be kept for a legitimate security purpose. The Gemara specifically discusses people living in dangerous areas who are permitted to keep a dog for protection.

Thus, the proposed use of crocodiles presents two possible grounds for leniency: the animals are intended to be securely contained, and their presence serves a legitimate security purpose.
in english

Rabbi Shay Tahan

in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan

in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan

in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
In English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
In English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in English

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Asking for a Friend”: When a Question Must Be Asked in Person

It is told that once a man came to ask a halachic question to Rabbi Elyashiv zt”l. Apparently, the question was somewhat embarrassing, so before asking, he preempted by saying he was asking “for a friend.” Rav Elyashiv, with his sharp insight, responded, “If so, your friend could have come himself and said he is asking for a friend.”
While it is crucial to ask a rabbi whenever one is unsure of the halachic ruling, there are times when a question simply cannot be asked by proxy. The person involved must come and ask himself. Today we’ll try to explain why it’s so.
The opening mishnah in Pirkei Avot (1:1) begins with the words of the Anshei Knesset HaGedolah: “Be moderate in judgment” — meaning, one should not answer halachic questions hastily, but rather deliberate thoroughly and consider all relevant factors before responding.
Rabbeinu Yonah explains that this is a directive to moreh hora’ah (halachic authorities) and poskim. There is, however, a key distinction between a moreh hora’ah and a posek: the role of the moreh hora’ah is to guide people based on what is written in the Shulchan Aruch, following the rulings of established poskim. In contrast, the posek’s task is to examine all facets of the issue and render an original decision rooted in deep halachic analysis. Examples of poskim are the leading Torah sages of the generation, while morei hora’ah are rabbis who have received certification and ordination to guide the public in halachic practice.
At first glance, it would seem that the command to “be deliberate in judgment” applies primarily to the posek, whose responsibility is to rule after carefully reviewing all relevant sources. Indeed, the weight of issuing a decision faithful to the truth of Torah rests heavily on his shoulders. However, upon deeper reflection, we see that this directive applies equally—perhaps even more so—to the moreh hora’ah.
This is essential because the moreh hora’ah must not only possess a deep understanding of the halachic topic—with its various perspectives and the opinions of the Rishonim and Acharonim—but must also understand the person standing before him, who is seeking guidance. He must determine whether the straightforward halacha applies as is, or whether the unique circumstances of the questioner call for a different approach.
Even more so, given that nearly every area of halacha contains differing opinions and multiple possible rulings, the moreh hora’ah must be deeply familiar with all sides in order to evaluate whether this particular case warrants stringency or leniency.
Rabbi Yannai said: “If the Torah had been given in a single, cut-and-dried form, it would have had no lasting strength.” (Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2).
The Pnei Moshe explains: “Had the Torah been given as a cut-and-dried law without room for interpretation in either direction, the world could not endure. The Torah must be subject to multiple interpretations. These and those are both the words of the living G-d.”
This teaching from the Yerushalmi beautifully clarifies our earlier point. If halacha had only one unyielding interpretation, the world could not function. Sometimes it is impossible to apply one uniform standard to all people and all situations. The Torah incorporates a range of legitimate outcomes and allows for nuance and flexibility. That is why one must know both the halacha in all its depth and the individual standing before him, and tailor the ruling accordingly.
This process is not trivial—it resembles a shidduch, which the Midrash compares to the splitting of the sea. If a rav issues a stringent ruling to someone who truly needs leniency, even if the ruling matches what is written in the Shulchan Aruch, he may have missed the truth. For this individual, halachic truth required leniency. And the reverse is equally true—a lenient ruling may be wrong if the individual before him required stringency.
This clarifies the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, who warns that a moreh hora’ah should not rely on his initial impression of a question, but must pause and examine it thoroughly and carefully, to avoid error in judgment. One might ask: if the halacha is unclear to him, why not simply open the Shulchan Aruch and the classic poskim and see what to rule? And if he cannot find the answer there, he can consult with other authorities to clarify the halacha.
Rabbeinu Yonah is teaching us the foundational principle discussed earlier: halacha is not applied rigidly or mechanically according to what is printed in the Shulchan Aruch alone. Rather, it must be adapted according to the context, the person, and the circumstances.

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

A Cut Above: Keeping Haircuts Kosher

Lag BaOmer, Klal Yisrael runs for haircuts and shaving, and it’s a good opportunity to review some of those halachot. Just as one must eat kosher food, he must also ensure that his haircut and shaving are kosher. It should also be noted that while many begin taking haircuts on Lag BaOmer, Sepharadim have the custom to wait until the following day, ל״ד בעומר (the 34th day of the Omer), before doing so.

What Makes a Haircut Kosher?
The Torah states that one may not cut the hair in a way that involves “לא תקיפו פאת ראשכם”—not rounding off the corners of the head (the peyot). This prohibits removing the sideburn areas in a manner that creates a rounded, uniform hairline from the front of the head to the back.
In this article, we will clarify the exact location of the prohibition of cutting the sideburns (peyot): where it begins, its boundaries from top to bottom, and the minimum length of hair that must be left.
Where the Peyot Begin (Top boundary):
If you draw an imaginary line from where the hairline of the forehead ends, straight back to where the hair behind the ear ends, everything from that line and downward is included in the peyot area.
From that point down, one must be careful not to remove the hair in a way that would violate the prohibition.

Where the Peyot End (Bottom):
The peyot extend downward from that line until the area of the ear. There are different opinions as to exactly how far: some say until the middle, and others hold until the bottom of the ear (the earlobe).
The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 181) writes that one may not cut the hair until the point where the ear ends. Rav Nissim Karelitz explained that this refers specifically to the opening in the middle of the ear; areas beyond that are not considered part of the ear.
Others understand that it extends until the end of the ear—across the point where the earlobe meets and separates from the face. A third view is more stringent and holds that the peyot extend even lower, continuing across the entire width of the earlobe.
Practically, many are lenient to follow the first opinion and measure only until the opening in the middle of the ear.

Minimum Length of the Peyot
There are three opinions regarding the minimum length of hair that must be left in the peyot. One opinion holds that each hair must be long enough to be bent back toward its root. A second, more lenient view requires leaving only enough hair that can be grasped with one’s fingernails. A third opinion maintains that any amount of hair that can be cut with scissors is sufficient.
The Rosh writes that one should follow the most stringent opinion, since this involves a doubt in a Torah prohibition.
Practically, these measurements can be understood in terms of clipper guards. According to Rav Elyashiv, one should leave at least about 5 mm, which is approximately a #1.5 guard. Rav Dovid Feinstein (Vedibarta Bam, p. 601) held that lechatchilah one should leave no less than 6.3 mm, roughly a #2 guard. In a pressing situation, one may be lenient with about 3.2 mm, which is around a #1 guard. The Mishnah Berurah (Biur Halacha 251) permits, bedieved, leaving even a very minimal amount.

Amount of Hair
The amount of hair that must be removed in order to violate the prohibition is a matter of dispute among the poskim. The Rambam holds that one does not violate the prohibition as long as approximately 40 hairs remain in the sideburn area. The Smag (Sefer Mitzvot Gadol), however, holds that even removing two hairs already constitutes a violation.
Practically, the halacha appears to follow the more stringent view, as the Shulchan Aruch writes that one may not remove hair from that area at all, indicating that even minimal removal is included in the prohibition.

Common Mistakes:
Many barbers use a razor or finishing machine at the end of a haircut to clean up and round the hair around the ear to make it look neat. By doing so, they may be violating the prohibition of removing the peyot.
Not only the barber, but also the person receiving the haircut is in violation. The Torah uses a plural form לא תקיפו to teach that the prohibition applies both to the one cutting and the one being cut.
Therefore, it is important to clearly instruct the barber beforehand not to use a razor or very close machine around the ear, and to use only scissors (or a permitted length with clippers) in that area.

Rabbi Shay Tahan
in english

Rabbi Donneal Epstein discusses these questions and how concepts like "stam keilim" and "marit ayin" come into play.

Can you get coffee from a non-kosher diner? What about Slurpees or fountain sodas from a gas station? 

The newest episode of the Keeping it Kosher podcast, Navigating Travel, is out now!

Host Rabbi Ezra Sarna is joined by Rabbi Donneal Epstein, OU Kosher Rabbinic Coordinator, to discuss practical halachos for kosher travel, covering everything from hotel coffee machines and rental home kitchens to highway rest stops and more.

https://keepingitkosher.org or wherever you get your podcasts.
in english

Rabbi Babayov
in english